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In contrast with traditional cryptographic protocols in which parties can have access to common
third parties, and where at least one of them is assumed to be honest, we propose here a new model
which is relevant for networks of communication devices with security modules. We then focus on
the problem of fair exchange in this model. We propose a probabilistic protocol which provides
arbitrarily low unfairness (involving a complexity cost).
I. Pirates and Guardian Angels Model
In classical mobile networks, the communication scheme is
made of both devices Pi and providers; the latter may have
put security modules Gi in their devices. Gi’s can only
communicate with their own Pi, and Pi’s can only commu-
nicate with both their security module and their provider.
In future network like self-organized mobile networks,
the communication chain looks as follows and providers
are no longer involved.
P1 ↔ P2 ↔ . . . ↔ Pn−1 ↔ Pn
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Here we may assume that all users try to optimize their
benefit and are potential pirates, and thus security modules
serve as Guardian Angels in order to enforce community
rules. Since users can modify the behavior of their devices,
we can consider a user and a device as a same entity, a
Pirate.
For practical considerations, we assume that guardians
are tamper-resistant, simple and limited devices, and that
they can only communicate with their own device P . Smart
cards are examples of guardian angels. Guardians are set
up by a given provider who may define his own community
bylaw. This setting may lead to some interesting business
models.
In this model, confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
are addressed in a classical way. A specific problem is the
insurance of receipt: how to certify that a message was well
transmitted and received? Here we address this problem in
context of fair exchange problem.
II. Fair Exchange Protocol
The proposed protocol is a probabilistic fair exchange pro-
tocol between two entities Pi and Pi+1 without trusted
third party, which is in this way particularly relevant for
self-organized networks. We recall first that an exchange
protocol is fair if, at the end of the execution, either both
parties have received the expected value vi and vi+1, or
none of them have received any information about the other
value.
In the pirates and angels model, we assume that Gi’s
have a virtual private network (VPN) which protects confi-
dentiality, integrity, authentication, and sequentiality of the
exchanged messages. So, the only possible attack consists
in aborting the protocol. During a first stage, Gi and Gi+1
use this VPN in order to exchange the expected values vi
and vi+1.
The remaining stage is a simple synchronization prob-
lem: Gi andGi+1 need to decide in a synchronous way that
the exchange succeeded in order to disclose the exchanged
value to their devices. In this synchronization protocol, the
guardians, in turn, send a message through the VPN. This
message can be a termination signal or some dummy ran-
dom value. To do this, they flip a coin with probability p to
issue a termination signal. The pirates Pi and Pi+1 are as-
sumed to be unable to distinguish the signal from a random
value. Then, guardians consider that the protocol succeeds
when they have both received and sent the termination sig-
nal. Since pirates are assumed to get no information in the
messages, they cannot decide to stop depending on the pro-
tocol view. Hence they must decide to stop at some level
no matter what the communication are.
An analysis of our synchronization protocol yields to
the following theorems:
Theorem 1: Let C be the number of messages exchanged
between Gi and Gi+1. If p is the termination probability,
we have E(C) = 3p − 1 when Pi and Pi+1 are honest.
Theorem 2 : If p is the termination probability and pa
the highest probability of unfairness over all possible
misbehavior of pirates, we have p4 ≤ pa ≤ p4(1−p) .
The proofs of these theorems are available in the
extended abstract, as well as variants and extensions.
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